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Abstract. We propose an efficient commutative group action suitable
for non-interactive key exchange in a post-quantum setting. Our con-
struction follows the layout of the Couveignes–Rostovtsev–Stolbunov
cryptosystem, but we apply it to supersingular elliptic curves defined
over a large prime field Fp, rather than to ordinary elliptic curves. The
Diffie–Hellman scheme resulting from the group action allows for public-
key validation at very little cost, runs reasonably fast in practice, and
has public keys of only 64 bytes at a conjectured AES-128 security level,
matching NIST’s post-quantum security category I.
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1 Introduction
During the past five to ten years, elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) has taken
over public-key cryptography on the internet and in security applications. Many
protocols such as Signal (https://signal.org) or TLS 1.3 rely on the small key
sizes and efficient computations to achieve forward secrecy, often meaning that
keys are used only once. However, it is also important to notice that security does
not break down if keys are reused. Indeed, some implementations of TLS, such
as Microsoft’s SChannel, reuse keys for some fixed amount of time rather than
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for one connection [3]. Google’s QUIC (https://chromium.org/quic) relies on
servers keeping their keys fixed for a while to achieve quick session resumption.
Several more examples are given by Freire, Hofheinz, Kiltz, and Paterson in
their paper [26] formalizing non-interactive key exchange. Some applications
require this functionality and for many it provides significant savings in terms of
roundtrips or implementation complexity. Finding a post-quantum system that
permits non-interactive key exchange while still offering decent performance is
considered an open problem. Our paper presents a solution to this problem.
Isogeny-based cryptography is a relatively new kind of elliptic-curve crypto-
graphy, whose security relies on (various incarnations of) the problem of finding
an explicit isogeny between two given isogenous elliptic curves over a finite field
Fq. One of the main selling points is that quantum computers do not seem to
make the isogeny-finding problem substantially easier. This contrasts with regu-
lar elliptic-curve cryptography, which is based on the discrete-logarithm problem
in a group and therefore falls prey to a polynomial-time quantum algorithm de-
signed by Shor in 1994 [58].
The first proposal of an isogeny-based cryptosystem was made by Couveignes
in 1997 [18]. It described a non-interactive key exchange protocol where the
space of public keys equals the set of Fq-isomorphism classes of ordinary elliptic
curves over Fq whose endomorphism ring is a given order O in an imaginary
quadratic field and whose trace of Frobenius has a prescribed value. It is well-
known that the ideal-class group cl(O) acts freely and transitively on this set
through the application of isogenies. Couveignes’ central observation was that
the commutativity of cl(O) naturally allows for a key-exchange protocol in the
style of Diffie and Hellman [24]. His work was only circulated privately and thus
not picked up by the community; the corresponding paper [18] was never form-
ally published and posted on ePrint only in 2006. The method was eventually
independently rediscovered by Rostovtsev and Stolbunov in 2004 (in Stolbunov’s
master’s thesis [61] and published on ePrint as [55] in 2006). In 2010, Childs, Jao
and Soukharev [13] showed that breaking the Couveignes–Rostovtsev–Stolbunov
scheme amounts to solving an instance of the abelian hidden-shift problem, for
which quantum algorithms with a time complexity of Lq[1/2] are known to exist;
see [44, 53]. While this may be tolerable (e.g., classical subexponential factoriza-
tion methods have not ended the widespread use of RSA), a much bigger concern
is that the scheme is unacceptably slow: despite recent clever speed-ups due to
De Feo, Kieffer, and Smith [22, 42], several minutes are needed for a single key
exchange at a presumed classical security level of 128 bits. Nevertheless, in view
of its conceptual simplicity, compactness, and flexibility, it seems a shame to
discard the Couveignes–Rostovtsev–Stolbunov scheme.
The attack due to Childs–Jao–Soukharev strongly relies on the fact that
cl(O) is commutative, hence indirectly on the fact that O is commutative. This
led Jao and De Feo [39] to consider the use of supersingular elliptic curves, whose
full ring of endomorphisms is an order in a quaternion algebra; in particular it
is non-commutative. Their resulting (interactive) key-agreement scheme, which
nowadays goes under the name “Supersingular Isogeny Diffie–Hellman” (SIDH),
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has attracted almost the entire focus of isogeny-based cryptography over the past
six years. The current state-of-the-art implementation is SIKE [38], which was
recently submitted to the NIST competition on post-quantum cryptography [49].
It should be stressed that SIDH is not the Couveignes–Rostovtsev–Stolbunov
scheme in which one substitutes supersingular elliptic curves for ordinary elliptic
curves; in fact SIDH is much more reminiscent of a cryptographic hash function
from 2006 due to Charles, Goren, and Lauter [12]. SIDH’s public keys consist of
the codomain of a secret isogeny and the image points of certain public points
under that isogeny. Galbraith, Petit, Shani, and Ti showed in [30] that SIDH
keys succumb to active attacks and thus should not be reused, unless combined
with a CCA transform such as the Fujisaki–Okamoto transform [27].
In this paper we show that adapting the Couveignes–Rostovtsev–Stolbunov
scheme to supersingular elliptic curves is possible, provided that one restricts to
supersingular elliptic curves defined over a prime field Fp. Instead of the full ring
of endomorphisms, which is non-commutative, one should consider the subring of
Fp-rational endomorphisms, which is again an order O in an imaginary quadratic
field. As before cl(O) acts via isogenies on the set of Fp-isomorphism classes of
elliptic curves whose Fp-rational endomorphism ring is isomorphic to O and
whose trace of Frobenius has a prescribed value; in fact if p ≥ 5 then there is
only one option for this value, namely 0, in contrast with the ordinary case. See
e.g. [71, Theorem 4.5], with further details to be found in [9, 23] and in Section 3
of this paper. Starting from these observations, the desired adaptation of the
Couveignes–Rostovtsev–Stolbunov scheme almost unrolls itself; the details can
be found in Section 4. We call the resulting scheme CSIDH, where the C stands
for “commutative”.1
While this fails to address Jao and De Feo’s initial motivation for using
supersingular elliptic curves, which was to avoid the Lq[1/2] quantum attack due
to Childs–Jao–Soukharev, we show that CSIDH eliminates the main problem of
the Couveignes–Rostovtsev–Stolbunov scheme, namely its inefficiency. Indeed, in
Section 8 we will report on a proof-of-concept implementation which carries out
a non-interactive key exchange at a presumed classical security level of 128 bits
and a conjectured post-quantum security level of 64 bits in about 80milliseconds,
while using key sizes of only 64 bytes. This is over 2000 times faster2 than the
current state-of-the-art instantiation of the Couveignes–Rostovtsev–Stolbunov
scheme by De Feo, Kieffer and Smith [22, 42], which itself presents many new
ideas and speedups to even achieve that speed.
For comparison, we remark that SIDH, which is the NIST submission with the
smallest combined key and ciphertext length, uses public keys and ciphertexts of
over 300 bytes each. More precisely SIKE’s version p503 uses uncompressed keys
of 378 bytes long [38] for achieving CCA security. The optimized SIKE imple-
1 Since this work was started while being very close to a well-known large body of salt
water, we pronounce CSIDH as ["si:­saId] rather than spelling out all the letters.
2 This speed-up is explained in part by comparing our own C implementation to the
sage implementation of De Feo–Kieffer–Smith.
4 W. Castryck, T. Lange, C. Martindale, L. Panny, and J. Renes
mentation is about ten times faster than our proof-of-concept C implementation,
but even at 80ms, CSIDH is practical.
Another major advantage of CSIDH is that we can efficiently validate public
keys, making it possible to reuse a key without the need for transformations to
confirm that the other party’s key was honestly generated.
Finally we note that just like the original Couveignes–Rostovtsev–Stolbunov
scheme, CSIDH relies purely on the isogeny-finding problem; no extra points are
sent that could potentially harm security, as argued in [51].
To summarize, CSIDH is a new cryptographic primitive that can serve as
a drop-in replacement for the (EC)DH key-exchange protocol while maintain-
ing security against quantum computers. It provides a non-interactive (static–
static) key exchange with full public-key validation. The speed is practical while
the public-key size is the smallest for key exchange or KEM in the portfolio of
post-quantum cryptography. This makes CSIDH particularly attractive in the
common scenario of prioritizing bandwidth over computational effort. In addi-
tion, CSIDH is compatible with 0-RTT protocols such as QUIC.
Why supersingular? To understand where the main speed-up comes from, it
suffices to record that De Feo–Kieffer–Smith had the idea of choosing a field of
characteristic p, where p is congruent to −1 modulo all small odd primes ` up
to a given bound. They then look for an ordinary elliptic curve E/Fp such that
#E(Fp) is congruent to 0 modulo as many of these `’s as possible, i.e., such that
points of order ` exist over Fp. These properties ensure that `O decomposes as a
product of two prime ideals l = (`, π− 1) and l = (`, π+1), where π denotes the
Frobenius endomorphism. For such primes the action of the corresponding ideal
classes [l] and [l] = [l]−1 can be computed efficiently through an application of
Vélu-type formulae to E (resp. its quadratic twist Et), the reason being that only
Fp-rational points are involved. If this works for enough primes `, we can expect
that a generic element of cl(O) can be written as a product of small integral
powers of such [l], so that the class-group action can be computed efficiently.
However, finding an ordinary elliptic curve E/Fp such that #E(Fp) is congruent
to 0 modulo many small primes ` is hard, and the main focus of De Feo–Kieffer–
Smith is on speeding up this search. In the end it is only practical to enforce
this for 7 primes, thus they cannot take full advantage of the idea.
However, in the supersingular case the property #E(Fp) = p + 1 implies
that #E(Fp) is congruent to 0 modulo all primes ` | p+ 1 that we started from
in building p! Concretely, our proof-of-concept implementation uses 74 small
odd primes, corresponding to prime ideals l1, l2, . . . , l74 for which we heurist-
ically expect that almost all elements of our 256-bit size class group can be
written as [l1]e1 [l2]e2 · · · [l74]e74 , where the exponents ei are taken from the range
{−5, . . . , 5}; indeed, one verifies that log (2 · 5 + 1)74 ≈ 255.9979. The action of
such an element can be computed as the composition of at most 5 ·74 = 370 easy
isogeny evaluations. This should be compared to using 7 small primes, where the
same approach would require exponents in a range of length about 2256/7 ≈ 236,
in view of which De Feo–Kieffer–Smith also resort to other primes with less
beneficial properties, requiring to work in extensions of Fp.
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The use of supersingular elliptic curves over Fp has various other advantages.
For instance, their trace of Frobenius t is 0, so that the absolute value of the
discriminant |t2 − 4p| = 4p is as large as possible. As a consequence, generically
the size of the class group cl(O) is close to its maximal possible value for a fixed
choice of p. Conversely, this implies that for a fixed security level we can make
a close-to-minimal choice for p, which directly affects the key size. Note that
this contrasts with the CM construction from [10], which could in principle be
used to construct ordinary elliptic curves having many points of small order, but
whose endomorphism rings have very small class groups, ruling them out for the
Couveignes–Rostovtsev–Stolbunov key exchange.
To explain why key validation works, note that we work over Fp with p ≡ 3
(mod 8) and start from the curve E0 : y2 = x3+x with Fp-rational endomorphism
ring O = Z[π]. As it turns out, all Montgomery curves EA : y2 = x3 + Ax2 + x
over Fp that are supersingular appear in the cl(O)-orbit of E0. Moreover their
Fp-isomorphism class is uniquely determined by A. So all one needs to do upon
receiving a candidate public key y2 = x3+Ax2+x is check for supersingularity,
which is an easy task; see Section 5. The combination of large size of cl(O) and
representation by a single Fp-element A explains the small key size of 64 bytes.
1.1 One-way group actions
Although non-interactive key exchange is the main application of our primitive,
it is actually more general: It is (conjecturally) an instance of Couveignes’ hard
homogeneous spaces [18], ultimately nothing but a finite commutative group
action for which some operations are easy to compute while others are hard.
Such group actions were first formalized and studied by Brassard and Yung [8].
We summarize Couveignes’ definition:
Definition 1. A hard homogeneous space consists of a finite commutative group
G acting freely and transitively on some set X.
The following tasks are required to be easy (e.g., polynomial-time):
– Compute the group operations in G.
– Sample randomly from G with (close to) uniform distribution.
– Decide validity and equality of a representation of elements of X.
– Compute the action of a group element g ∈ G on some x ∈ X.
The following problems are required to be hard (e.g., not polynomial-time):
– Given x, x′ ∈ X, find g ∈ G such that g ∗ x = x′.
– Given x, x′, y ∈ X such that x′ = g ∗ x, find y′ = g ∗ y.
Any such primitive immediately implies a natural Diffie–Hellman protocol: Alice
and Bob’s private keys are random elements a, b of G, their public keys are a∗x0
resp. b ∗ x0, where x0 ∈ X is a public fixed element, and the shared secret is
b ∗ (a ∗ x0) = a ∗ (b ∗ x0). The private keys are protected by the difficulty of
the first hard problem above, while the shared secret is protected by the second
problem. Note that traditional Diffie–Hellman on a cyclic group C is an instance
of this, where X is the set of generators of C and G is the multiplicative group
(Z/#C)∗ acting by exponentiation.
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1.2 Notation and terminology
We stress that throughout this paper, we consider two elliptic curves defined over
the same field identical whenever they are isomorphic over that field. Note that
we do not identify curves that are only isomorphic over some extension field, as
opposed to what is done in SIDH, for instance. In the same vein, for an elliptic
curve E defined over a finite field Fp, we let Endp(E) be the subring of the
endomorphism ring End(E) consisting of endomorphisms defined over Fp.3 This
subring is always isomorphic to an order in an imaginary quadratic number field.
Conversely, for a given order O in an imaginary quadratic field and an element
π ∈ O, we let È `p(O, π) denote the set of elliptic curves E defined over Fp with
Endp(E) ∼= O such that π corresponds to the Fp-Frobenius endomorphism of E.
In particular, this implies that ϕ ◦ β = β ◦ ϕ for all Fp-isogenies ϕ between two
curves in È `p(O, π) and all β ∈ O interpreted as endomorphisms.
Ideals are always assumed to be non-zero.
The notation “log” refers to the base-2 logarithm.
Acknowledgements. This project started during a research retreat on post-
quantum cryptography, organized by the European PQCRYPTO and ECRYPT-
CSA projects in Tenerife from 29 January until 1 February 2018. We would like
to thank Jeffrey Burdges, whose quest for a flexible post-quantum key exchange
protocol made us look for speed-ups of the Couveignes–Rostovtsev–Stolbunov
scheme. We are grateful to Luca De Feo, Jean Kieffer, and Ben Smith for sharing
a draft of their paper in preparation, and to Daniel J. Bernstein, Luca De Feo,
Jeroen Demeyer, Léo Ducas, Steven Galbraith, David Jao, and Fré Vercauteren
for helpful feedback.
2 Isogeny graphs
Good mixing properties of the underlying isogeny graph are relevant for the
security of isogeny-based cryptosystems. Just as in the original Couveignes–
Rostovtsev–Stolbunov cryptosystem, in our case this graph is obtained by taking
the union of several large subgraphs (each being a union of large isomorphic cycle
graphs) on the same vertex set, one for each prime ` under consideration; see
Figure 1 for a (small) example. Such a graph is the Schreier graph associated with
our class-group action and the chosen generators. We refer to the lecture notes
of De Feo [20, §14.1] for more background and to [41] for a discussion of its rapid
mixing properties. One point of view on this is that one can quickly move between
distant nodes in the subgraph corresponding to one generator by switching to the
subgraph corresponding to another generator. This thereby replaces the square-
and-multiply algorithm in exponentiation-based cryptosystems (such as classical
Diffie–Hellman).
The goal of this section is to analyze the structure of the individual cycles.
3 This constraint only makes a difference for supersingular curves: in the ordinary
case, all endomorphisms are defined over the base field.
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Figure 1. Union of the supersingular `-isogeny graphs for ` ∈ {3, 5, 7} over F419.
CSIDH makes use of the larger component, corresponding to curves whose ring of
F419-rational endomorphisms is isomorphic to Z[
√
−419].
Definition 2. For a field k and a prime ` - char k, the k-rational `-isogeny graph
Gk,` is defined as having all the elliptic curves defined over k as its vertices, and
having a directed edge (E1, E2) for each k-rational `-isogeny from E1 to E2.4
Remark 3. A priori Gk,` is a directed graph, but given two elliptic curves E1
and E2 whose j-invariants are not in {0, 1728}, there are exactly as many edges
(E2, E1) as (E1, E2), obtained by taking dual isogenies. Annoyingly, the nodes
with j-invariants 0 and 1728 are more complicated, since these are exactly the
curves with extra automorphisms: an elliptic curve E in Gk,` has fewer incoming
than outgoing edges if and only if either j(E) = 0 and
√
−3 ∈ k, or if j(E) =
1728 and
√
−1 ∈ k. Throughout this paper, we will assume for simplicity that√
−3,
√
−1 /∈ k, so that neither of these automorphisms are defined over k and
we may view Gk,` as an undirected graph. In the case of a finite prime field
k = Fp, it suffices to restrict to p ≡ 11 (mod 12), which will be satisfied in the
class of instantiations we suggest.
If k = Fq is a finite field, then Gk,` is a finite graph that is the disjoint union
of ordinary connected components and supersingular connected components.
The ordinary components were studied in Kohel’s PhD thesis [43]. Due to their
regular structure, these components later became known as isogeny volcanoes.
In general (e.g. over non-prime fields), the supersingular components may
bear no similarity at all to the volcanoes of the ordinary case. Traditionally,
following Pizer [52], one instead studies the unique supersingular component of
Gk,` where k = Fq, which turns out to be a finite (`+1)-regular Ramanujan
graph and forms the basis for the SIDH protocol.
4 Due to our convention of identifying k-isomorphic curves, we also identify isogenies
if they are k-isomorphic, i.e., equal up to post-composition with a k-isomorphism.
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However, Delfs and Galbraith [23] showed that if k = Fp is a finite prime
field, then all connected components are volcanoes, even in the supersingular case
(where the depth is at most 1 at ` = 2 and 0 otherwise). We present a special
case of a unified statement, restricting our attention to the cases in which GFp,`
is a cycle. Recall that Endp(E) is an order O in the imaginary quadratic field
Endp(E)⊗Z Q ∼= Q(
√
t2 − 4p) = K,
where |t| ≤ 2√p denotes the (absolute value of the) trace of the Frobenius
endomorphism, and that two curves are isogenous over Fp if and only if their
traces of Frobenius are equal [67, Theorem 1].
Theorem 4 (Kohel, Delfs–Galbraith). Let p ≥ 5 be a prime number and
let V be a connected component of GFp,`. Assume that p ≡ 11 (mod 12) or that
V contains no curve with j-invariant 0 or 1728. Let t be the trace of Frobenius
common to all vertices in V , and let K be as above. Assume that ` - t2 − 4p.
Then all elliptic curves in V have the same Fp-rational endomorphism ring
O ⊆ K, and O is locally maximal at `. Moreover if t2−4p is a (non-zero) square
modulo `, then V is a cycle whose length equals the order of [l] in cl(O), where
l is a prime ideal dividing `O. If not, then V consists of a single vertex and no
edges.
Proof. In the case of an ordinary component this is just a special case of [66,
Theorem 7]. In the case of a supersingular component this follows from the proof
of [23, Theorem 2.7]. (In both cases, we could alternatively (re)prove this theorem
by proving that an `-isogeny can only change the conductor of the endomorphism
ring of an elliptic curve locally at ` and applying Theorem 7.) ut
In the ordinary case a curve and its quadratic twist can never appear in
the same component because they have a different trace of Frobenius. This is
the main difference with the supersingular case, where this possibility is not
excluded. To avoid confusion, we clarify that by the quadratic twist of a given
elliptic curve E : y2 = f(x) over Fp we mean the curve Et : dy2 = f(x), where
d ∈ F∗p is any non-square. If p ≡ 3 (mod 4) and j(E) = 1728 then this may
deviate from what some readers are used to, because in this case Et and E are
Fp-isomorphic. Note that such a curve is necessarily supersingular.
Remark 5. In fact, if p ≡ 3 mod 4 then there are two non-isomorphic curves
over Fp with j-invariant 1728, namely y2 = x3 − x and y2 = x3 + x, whose
endomorphism rings are the full ring of integers Z[(1 +
√
−p)/2] and the order
Z[
√
−p] of conductor 2 respectively. The connected component of each curve
is “symmetric”: if E is n steps along GFp,` in one direction from a curve of
j-invariant 1728 then the curve that is n steps in the other direction is the
quadratic twist of E. In the case of GF83,3 we can see this in Figure 2, which is
taken from [23, Figure 8].
It is also interesting to observe that the symmetry around j = 1728 confirms





at least in the case that p ≡ 3 (mod 4); see [48].
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y2 = x3 − x
y2 = x3 − 13x2 − xy2 = x3 + 13x2 − x
y2 = x3 + x
y2 = x3 − 11x2 + x
y2 = x3 − 12x2 + x
y2 = x3 − 6x2 + x
y2 = x3 + 13x2 + xy2 = x3 − 13x2 + x
y2 = x3 + 6x2 + x
y2 = x3 + 12x2 + x
y2 = x3 + 11x2 + x
Figure 2. The two supersingular components of GF83,3. The curves in the top com-
ponent have Fp-rational endomorphism ring Z[(1+
√
−83)/2], while those in the lower
component correspond to Z[
√
−83]. Running clockwise through these components cor-
responds to the repeated action of [(3, π − 1)].
3 The class-group action
It is well-known that the ideal-class group of an imaginary quadratic order O acts
freely via isogenies on the set of elliptic curves with Fp-rational endomorphism
ring O. Using this group action on a set of ordinary elliptic curves for cryp-
tographic purposes was first put forward by Couveignes [18] and independently
rediscovered later by Rostovtsev and Stolbunov [61, 55]. Our suggestion is to use
the equivalent of their construction in the supersingular setting, thus the follow-
ing discussion covers both cases at once. For concreteness, we focus on prime
fields with p ≥ 5 and point out that the ordinary (but not the supersingular)
case generalizes to all finite fields. We recall the following standard lemma:
Lemma 6. Let E/Fp be an elliptic curve and G a finite Fp-rational (i.e., stable
under the action of the Fp-Frobenius) subgroup of E. Then there exists an elliptic
curve E′/Fp and a separable isogeny ϕ : E → E′ defined over Fp with kernel G.
The codomain E′ and isogeny ϕ are unique up to Fp-isomorphism.5
Proof. [60, Proposition III.4.12, Remark III.4.13.2, and Exercise III.3.13e]. ut
The ideal-class group. We recall the definitions and basic properties of class
groups of quadratic orders that will be needed in the following. This section
is based on [19, §7]. Let K be a quadratic number field and O ⊆ K an order
(that is, a subring which is a free Z-module of rank 2). The norm of an O-ideal
5 This statement remains true in vast generality, but we only need this special case.
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a ⊆ O is defined as N(a) = |O/a|; it is equal to gcd({N(α) | α ∈ a}). Norms are
multiplicative: N(ab) = N(a)N(b).
A fractional ideal of O is an O-submodule ofK of the form αa, where α ∈ K∗
and a is an O-ideal.6 Fractional ideals can be multiplied and conjugated in
the evident way, and the norm extends multiplicatively to fractional ideals. A
fractional O-ideal a is invertible if there exists a fractional O-ideal b such that
ab = O. If such a b exists, we define a−1 = b. Clearly all principal fractional
ideals αO, where α ∈ K∗, are invertible.
By construction, the set of invertible fractional ideals I(O) forms an abelian
group under ideal multiplication. This group contains the principal fractional
ideals P (O) as a (clearly normal) subgroup, hence we may define the ideal-class
group of O as the quotient
cl(O) = I(O)/P (O) .
Every ideal class [a] ∈ cl(O) has an integral representative, and for any non-zero
M ∈ Z there even exists an integral representative of norm coprime to M .
There is a unique maximal order of K with respect to inclusion called the
ring of integers and denoted OK . The conductor of O (in OK) is the index
f = [OK : O]. Away from the conductor, ideals are well-behaved; every O-ideal
of norm coprime to the conductor is invertible and factors uniquely into prime
ideals.
The class-group action. Fix a prime p ≥ 5 and an (ordinary or supersingular)
elliptic curve E defined over Fp. The Frobenius endomorphism π of E satisfies
a characteristic equation
π2 − tπ + p = 0
in Endp(E), where t ∈ Z is the trace of Frobenius. The curve E is supersingular
if and only if t = 0. The Fp-rational endomorphism ring Endp(E) is an order
O in the imaginary quadratic field K = O ⊗Z Q ∼= Q(
√
∆), where ∆ = t2 − 4p.
We note that O always contains the Frobenius endomorphism π, and hence the
order Z[π].
Any invertible ideal a of O splits into a product of O-ideals as (πO)ras, where
as * πO. This defines an elliptic curve E/a and an isogeny
ϕa : E → E/a
of degree N(a) as follows [71]: the separable part of ϕa has kernel
⋂
α∈as kerα,
and the purely inseparable part consists of r iterations of Frobenius. The iso-
geny ϕa and codomain E/a are both defined over Fp and are unique up to
Fp-isomorphism (by Lemma 6), justifying the notation E/a. Multiplication of
ideals corresponds to the composition of isogenies. Since principal ideals corres-
pond to endomorphisms, two ideals lead to the same codomain if and only if they
6 Note that the use of the word “ideal” is inconsistent in the literature. We make the
convention that “ideal” without qualification refers to an integral O-ideal (i.e., an
ideal in the sense of ring theory), while fractional ideals are clearly named as such.
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are equal up to multiplication by a principal fractional ideal. Moreover, every Fp-
isogeny ψ between curves in È `p(O, π) comes from an invertible O-ideal in this
way, and the ideal as can be recovered from ψ as as = {α ∈ O | kerα ⊇ kerψ}.
In other words:
Theorem 7. Let O be an order in an imaginary quadratic field and π ∈ O such
that È `p(O, π) is non-empty. Then the ideal-class group cl(O) acts freely and
transitively on the set È `p(O, π) via the map
cl(O)× È `p(O, π) −→ È `p(O, π)
([a], E) 7−→ E/a,
in which a is chosen as an integral representative.
Proof. See [71, Theorem 4.5]. Erratum: [56, Theorem 4.5]. ut
To emphasize the fact that we are dealing with a group action, we will from now
on write [a] ∗ E or simply [a]E for the curve E/a defined above.
The structure of the class group. The class group cl(O) is a finite abelian




More precise heuristics actually predict that #cl(O) grows a little bit faster than√
|∆|, but the ratio is logarithmically bounded so we content ourselves with
the above estimate. The exact structure of the class group can be computed
in subexponential time L|∆|[1/2;
√
2 + o(1)] using an algorithm of Hafner and
McCurley [34]. Unfortunately, this requires too much computation for the sizes
of ∆ we are working with, but there are convincing heuristics concerning the
properties of the class group we need. See Section 7.1 for these arguments. If
the absolute value |t| of the trace of Frobenius is “not too big”, the discriminant
∆ is about the size of p, hence by the above approximation we may assume
#cl(O) ≈ √p. This holds in particular when E is supersingular, where t = 0,
hence |∆| = 4p.
We are interested in primes ` that split in O, i.e., such that there exist
(necessarily conjugate) distinct prime ideals l, l of O with `O = ll. Such ` are
known as Elkies primes in the point-counting literature. The ideal l is generated
as l = (`, π−λ), where λ ∈ Z/` is an eigenvalue of the Frobenius endomorphism π
on the `-torsion, and its conjugate is l = (`, π−p/λ), where by abuse of notation
p/λ denotes any integral representative of that quotient modulo `. Note that `
splits in O if and only if ∆ is a non-zero square modulo `.
Computing the group action. Any element of the class group can be repres-
ented as a product of small prime ideals [11, Propositions 9.5.2 and 9.5.3], hence
we describe how to compute [l]E for a prime ideal l = (`, π − λ). There are (at
least) the following ways to proceed, which vary in efficiency depending on the
circumstances [22, 42]:
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– Find Fp-rational roots of the modular polynomial Φ`(j(E), Y ) to determine
the two j-invariants of possible codomains (i.e., up to four non-isomorphic
curves, though in the ordinary case wrong twists can easily be ruled out);
compute the kernel polynomials [43] χ ∈ Fp[x] for the corresponding iso-
genies (if they exist); if (xp, yp) = [λ](x, y) modulo χ and the curve equation,
then the codomain was correct, else another choice is correct.
– Factor the `th division polynomial ψ`(E) over Fp; collect irreducible factors
with the right Frobenius eigenvalues (as above); use Kohel’s formulas [43,
Section 2.4] to compute the codomain.
– Find a basis of the `-torsion — possibly over an extension field — and
compute the eigenspaces of Frobenius; apply Vélu’s formulas [70] to a basis
point of the correct eigenspace to compute the codomain.
As observed in [22, 42], the last method is the fastest if the necessary extension
fields are small. The optimal case is λ = 1; in that case, the curve has a rational
point defined over the base field Fp. If in addition p/λ = −1, the other eigenspace
of Frobenius modulo ` is defined over Fp2 , so both codomains can easily be
computed using Vélu’s formulas over an at most quadratic extension (but in
fact, a good choice of curve model allows for pure prime field computations, see
Section 8; alternatively one could switch to the quadratic twist). Note that if
p ≡ −1 (mod `), then λ = 1 automatically implies p/λ = −1.
Much of De Feo–Kieffer–Smith’s work [22, 42] is devoted to finding an ordin-
ary elliptic curve E with many small Elkies primes ` such that both E and its
quadratic twist Et have an Fp-rational `-torsion point. Despite considerable ef-
fort leading to various improvements, the results are discouraging. With the best
parameters found within 17 000 hours of CPU time, evaluating one class-group
action still requires several minutes of computation to complete. This suggests
that without new ideas, the original Couveignes–Rostovtsev–Stolbunov scheme
will not become anything close to practical in the foreseeable future.
4 Construction and design choices
In this section, we discuss the construction of our proposed group action and jus-
tify our design decisions. For algorithmic details, see Section 8. Notice that the
main obstacle to performance in the Couveignes–Rostovtsev–Stolbunov scheme
— constructing a curve with highly composite order — becomes trivial when
using supersingular curves instead of ordinary curves, since for p ≥ 5 any super-
singular elliptic curve over Fp has exactly p+ 1 rational points.
The cryptographic group action described below is a straightforward imple-
mentation of this construction. Note that we require p ≡ 3 (mod 4) so that we
can easily write down a supersingular elliptic curve over Fp and so that an imple-
mentation may use curves in Montgomery form. It turns out that this choice is
also beneficial for other reasons. In principle, this constraint is not necessary for
the theory to work, although the structure of the isogeny graph changes slightly
(see [23] and Remark 3 for details).
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Parameters. Fix a large prime p of the form 4 · `1 · · · `n − 1, where the `i are
small distinct odd primes. Fix the elliptic curve E0 : y2 = x3 + x over Fp; it
is supersingular since p ≡ 3 (mod 4). The Frobenius endomorphism π satisfies
π2 = −p, so its Fp-rational endomorphism ring is an order in the imaginary
quadratic field Q(
√
−p). More precisely, Proposition 8 (below) shows Endp(E0) =
Z[π], which has conductor 2.
Rational Elkies primes. By Theorem 4, the choices made above imply that the
`i-isogeny graph is a disjoint union of cycles. Moreover, since π2−1 ≡ 0 (mod `i)
the ideals `iO split as `iO = lili, where li = (`i, π − 1) and li = (`i, π + 1). In
other words, all the `i are Elkies primes. In particular, we can use any one of
the three algorithms described at the end of Section 3 to walk along the cycles.
Furthermore, the kernel of ϕli is the intersection of the kernels of the scalar
multiplication [`i] and the endomorphism π − 1. That is, it is the subgroup
generated by a point P of order `i which lies in the kernel of π − 1 or, in other
words, is defined over Fp. Similarly, the kernel of ϕli is generated by a point Q
of order `i that is defined over Fp2 but not Fp and such that π(Q) = −Q. This
greatly simplifies and accelerates the implementation, since it allows performing
all computations over the base field (see Section 8 for details).
Sampling from the class group. Ideally,7 we would like to know the exact
structure of the ideal-class group cl(O) to be able to sample elements uniformly
at random. However, such a computation is currently not feasible for the size of
discriminant we need, hence we resort to heuristic arguments. Assuming that the
li do not have very small order and are “evenly distributed” in the class group, we
can expect ideals of the form le11 l
e2
2 · · · lenn for small ei to lie in the same class only
very occasionally. For efficiency reasons, it is desirable to sample the exponents
ei from a short range centered around zero, say {−m, . . . ,m} for some integer
m. We will argue in Section 7.1 that choosing m such that 2m+ 1 ≥ n
√
#cl(O)





may simply be represented as a vector (e1, . . . , en).





i on an elliptic curve E proceeds as outlined in Section 3.
Since π2 = −p ≡ 1 (mod `i), we are now in the favourable situation that the
eigenvalues of Frobenius on all `i-torsion subgroups are +1 and −1. Hence we
can efficiently compute the action of li (resp. li) by finding an Fp-rational point
(resp. Fp2-rational with Frobenius eigenvalue −1) of order `i and applying Vélu-
type formulas. This step could simply be repeated for each ideal l±1i whose action
is to be evaluated, but see Section 8 for a more efficient method.
7 No pun intended.
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5 Representing and validating Fp-isomorphism classes
A major unsolved problem of SIDH is its lack of public-key validation, i.e., the in-
ability to verify that a public key was honestly generated. This shortcoming leads
to polynomial-time active attacks [30] on static variants for which countermeas-
ures are expensive. For example, the actively secure variant SIKE [38] applies
a transformation proposed by Hofheinz, Hövelmanns, and Kiltz [37] which is
similar to the Fujisaki–Okamoto transform [27], essentially doubling the running
time on the recipient’s side compared to an ephemeral key exchange.
The following proposition tackles this problem for our family of CSIDH in-
stantiations. Moreover, it shows that the Montgomery coefficient forms a unique
representative for the Fp-isomorphism class resulting from the group action,
hence may serve as a shared secret without taking j-invariants.
Proposition 8. Let p ≥ 5 be a prime such that p ≡ 3 (mod 8), and let E/Fp be
a supersingular elliptic curve. Then Endp(E) = Z[π] if and only if there exists
A ∈ Fp such that E is Fp-isomorphic to the curve EA : y2 = x3 + Ax2 + x.
Moreover, if such an A exists then it is unique.
Proof. First suppose that E is isomorphic over Fp to EA for some A ∈ Fp. If EA
has full Fp-rational 2-torsion, then Table 1 of [17] shows that either EA or its
quadratic twist must have order divisible by 8. However, both have cardinality
p + 1 ≡ 4 (mod 8). Hence EA can only have one Fp-rational point of order 2.
With Theorem 2.7 of [23], we can conclude Endp(E) = Endp(EA) = Z[π].
Now assume that Endp(E) = Z[π]. By Theorem 7, the class group cl(Z[π])
acts transitively on È `p(Z[π], π), so in particular there exists [a] ∈ cl(Z[π]) such
that [a]E0 = E, where E0 : y2 = x3 + x. Choosing a representative a that has
norm coprime to 2p yields a separable Fp-isogeny ϕa : E0 → E of odd degree.
Thus, by [54, Proposition 1] there exists an A ∈ Fp and a separable isogeny
ψ : E0 → EA : y2 = x3 + Ax2 + x defined over Fp such that kerψ = kerϕa. As
isogenies defined over Fp with given kernel are unique up to post-composition
with Fp-isomorphisms (Lemma 6), we conclude that E is Fp-isomorphic to EA.
Finally, let B ∈ Fp such that EA ∼= EB : Y 2 = X3 +BX2 +X. Then by [60,
Proposition III.3.1(b)] there exist u ∈ F∗p and r, s, t ∈ Fp such that
x = u2X + r , y = u3Y + su2X + t .
Substituting this into the curve equation for EA and subtracting the equation
of EB (scaled by u6) equals zero in the function field and thus leads to a linear
relation over Fp between the functions 1, X, X2, Y , and XY . Writing∞ for the
point at infinity of EB , it follows from Riemann–Roch [60, Theorem 5.4] that
L(5(∞)) is a 5-dimensional Fp-vector space with basis {1, X, Y,X2, XY }. Hence
the obtained linear relation must be trivial, and a straightforward computation
yields the relations
s = t = 0 , 3r2 + 2Ar + 1 = u4 ,
3r +A = Bu2 , r3 +Ar2 + r = 0 .
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But since EA only has a single Fp-rational point of order 2, the only r ∈ Fp such
that r3 + Ar2 + r = 0 is simply r = 0. In that case u4 = 1, and hence u = ±1
since p ≡ 3 (mod 8). In particular, u2 = 1 and thus A = B. ut
Therefore, by choosing public keys to consist of a Montgomery coefficient A ∈ Fp,
Proposition 8 guarantees that A represents a curve in the correct isogeny class
È `p(O, π), where π =
√
−p and O = Z[π], under the assumption that it is
smooth (i.e. A /∈ {±2}) and supersingular.
Verifying supersingularity. As p ≥ 5, an elliptic curve E defined over Fp
is supersingular if and only if #E(Fp) = p + 1 [60, Exercise 5.10]. In general,
proving that an elliptic curve has a given order N is easy if the factorization of
N is known; exhibiting a subgroup (or in particular, a single point) whose order
d is a divisor of N greater than 4√p implies the order must be correct. Indeed,
the condition d > 4√p implies that there exists only one multiple of d in the
Hasse interval [p+ 1− 2√p; p+ 1+ 2√p] [36]. This multiple must be the group
order by Lagrange’s theorem.
Now note that a random point generally has very large order d. In our case
E(Fp) ∼= Z/4 ×
∏n
i=1 Z/`i, so that `i | d with probability (`i − 1)/`i. Ignoring









This product is about the same size as p, and it is easily seen that a random point
will with overwhelming probability have order (much) greater than 4√p. This
observation leads to a straightforward verification method, see Algorithm 1.8
Algorithm 1: Verifying supersingularity.
Input: An elliptic curve E/Fp, where p = 4 · `1 · · · `n − 1.
Output: supersingular or ordinary.
Randomly pick a point P ∈ E(Fp) and set d← 1.
for each `i do
Set Qi ← [(p+ 1)/`i]P .
If [`i]Qi 6=∞ then return ordinary. // since #E(Fp) - p+ 1
If Qi 6=∞ then set d← `i · d. // since `i | ordP
If d > 4√p then return supersingular.
If the condition d > 4√p does not hold at the end of Algorithm 1, the point P
had too small order to prove #E(Fp) = p + 1. In this case one may retry with
a new random point P (although this outcome has negligible probability and
8 The same idea gives rise to a simpler Monte Carlo algorithm which does not require
the factorization of p+ 1 but has a chance of false positives [65, Section 2.3].
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could just be ignored). There is no possibility of wrongly classifying an ordinary
curve as supersingular.
Note moreover that if x-only Montgomery arithmetic is used (as we suggest)
and the point P is obtained by choosing a random x-coordinate in Fp, there is no
need to differentiate between points defined over Fp and Fp2 ; any x-coordinate in
Fp works. Indeed, any point that has an x-coordinate in Fp but is only defined
over Fp2 corresponds to an Fp-rational point on the quadratic twist, which is
supersingular if and only if the original curve is supersingular.
There are more optimized variants of this algorithm; the bulk of the work
are the scalar multiplications required to compute the points Qi = [(p+1)/`i]P .
Since they are all multiples of P with shared factors, one may more efficiently
compute all Qi at the same time using a divide-and-conquer strategy (at the
expense of higher memory usage). See Section 8, and in particular Algorithm 3,
for details.
6 Non-interactive key exchange
Starting from the class-group action on supersingular elliptic curves and the
parameter choices outlined in Sections 3 and 4, one obtains the following non-
interactive key-exchange protocol.
Setup. Global parameters of the scheme are a large prime p = 4 · `1 · · · `n−1,
where the `i are small distinct odd primes, and the supersingular elliptic curve
E0 : y
2 = x3 + x over Fp with endomorphism ring O = Z[π].
Key generation. The private key is an n-tuple (e1, . . . , en) of integers, each
sampled randomly from a range {−m, . . . ,m}. These integers represent the
ideal class [a] = [le11 · · · lenn ] ∈ cl(O), where li = (`i, π−1). The public key is the
Montgomery coefficient A ∈ Fp of the elliptic curve [a]E0 : y2 = x3 +Ax2 + x
obtained by applying the action of [a] to the curve E0.
Key exchange. Suppose Alice and Bob have key pairs ([a], A) and ([b], B).
Upon receiving Bob’s public key B ∈ Fp \{±2}, Alice verifies that the elliptic
curve EB : y2 = x3 + Bx2 + x is indeed in È `p(O, π) using Algorithm 1.
She then applies the action of her secret key [a] to EB to compute the curve
[a]EB = [a][b]E0. Bob proceeds analogously with his own secret [b] and Alice’s
public key A to compute the curve [b]EA = [b][a]E0. The shared secret is the
Montgomery coefficient S of the common secret curve [a][b]E0 = [b][a]E0
written in the form y2 = x3 + Sx2 + x, which is the same for Alice and Bob
due to the commutativity of cl(O) and Proposition 8.
Remark 9. Besides key exchange, we expect that our cryptographic group ac-
tion will have several other applications, given the resemblance with traditional
Diffie–Hellman and the ease of verifying the correctness of public keys. We refer
to previous papers on group actions for a number of suggestions in this direc-
tion, in particular Brassard–Yung [8], Couveignes [18, §4], and Stolbunov [62].
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We highlight the following 1-bit identification scheme, which in our case uses a
key pair ([a], A) as above. One randomly samples an element [b] ∈ cl(O) and
commits to a curve E′ = [b]E0. Depending on a challenge bit b, one then releases
either [b] or [c] := [b][a]−1, as depicted in Figure 3. As already pointed out in
Stolbunov’s PhD thesis [63, §2.B], this can be turned into a signature scheme by
repeated application of the 1-bit protocol and by applying the Fiat–Shamir [25]
or Unruh [69] transformation. However, we point out that it is not immediately
clear how to represent [c] in a way that is efficiently computable and leaks no
information about the secret key [a]. We leave a resolution of this issue for future
research, but mention that a related problem was recently tackled by Galbraith,
Petit and Silva [31] who studied a similar triangular identification protocol in





Figure 3. A 1-bit identification protocol.
7 Security
The central problem of our new primitive is the following analogue to the classical
discrete-logarithm problem.
Problem 10 (Key recovery). Given two supersingular elliptic curves E,E′ defined
over Fp with the same Fp-rational endomorphism ring O, find an ideal a of O
such that [a]E = E′. This ideal must be represented in such a way that the
action of [a] on a curve can be evaluated efficiently, for instance a could be given
as a product of ideals of small norm.
Note that just like in the classical group-based scenario, security notions of
Diffie–Hellman schemes built from our primitive rely on slightly different hard-
ness assumptions (cf. Section 1.1) that are straightforward translations of the
computational and decisional Diffie–Hellman problems. However, continuing the
analogy with the classical case, and since we are not aware of any ideas to at-
tack the key exchange without recovering one of the keys, we will assume in the
following analysis that the best approach to breaking the key-exchange protocol
is to solve Problem 10.
We point out that the “inverse Diffie-Hellman problem” is easy in the context
of CSIDH: given [a]E0 we can compute [a]−1E0 by mere quadratic twisting; see
9 The “square” SIDH counterparts of this protocol, as considered in [21, 31, 72], are
not meaningful in the case of a commutative group action.
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Remark 5. This contrasts with the classical group-based setting [29, §21.1]. Note
that just like identifying a point (x, y) with its inverse (x,−y) in an ECDLP
setting, this implies a security loss of one bit under some attacks: An attacker
may consider the curves [a]E and [a]−1E identical, which reduces the search
space by half.
No torsion-point images. One of the most worrying properties of SIDH
seems to be that Alice and Bob publish the images of known points under
their secret isogenies along with the codomain curve, i.e., a public key is of
the form (E′, ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)) where ϕ : E → E′ is a secret isogeny and P,Q ∈ E
are publicly known points. Although thus far nobody has succeeded in making
use of this extra information to break the original scheme, Petit presented an
attack using these points when overstretched, highly asymmetric parameters are
used [51]. The Couveignes–Rostovtsev–Stolbunov scheme, and consequently our
new scheme CSIDH, does not transmit such additional points — a public key
consists of only an elliptic curve. Thus we are confident that a potential future
attack against SIDH based on these torsion points would not apply to CSIDH.
Chosen-ciphertext attacks. As explained in Section 5, the CSIDH group
action features efficient public-key validation. This implies it can be used without
applying a CCA transform such as the Fujisaki–Okamoto transform [27], thus
enabling efficient non-interactive key exchange and other applications in a post-
quantum world.
7.1 Classical security
We begin by considering classical attacks.
Exhaustive key search. The most obvious approach to attack any cryptosys-
tem is to simply search through all possible keys. In the following, we will argue
that our construction provides sufficient protection against key search attacks,
including dumb brute force and (less naïvely) a meet-in-the-middle approach.
As explained in Section 4, a private key of our scheme consists of an exponent
vector (e1, . . . , en) where each ei is in the range {−m, . . . ,m}, representing the
ideal class [le11 l
e2
2 · · · lenn ] ∈ cl(O). There may (and typically will) be multiple such
vectors that represent the same ideal class and thus form equivalent private keys.
However, we argue (heuristically) that the number of short representations per
ideal class is small. Here and in the following, “short” means that all ei are in the
range {−m, . . . ,m}. The maximum number of such short representations imme-
diately yields the min-entropy10 of our sampling method, which measures the
amount of work a brute-force attacker has to do while conducting an exhaustive
search for the key.
10 The min-entropy of a random variable is the negative logarithm of the probability
of the most likely outcome.
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We assume in the following discussion that cl(O) is “almost cyclic” in the
sense that it has a very large cyclic component, say of order N not much smaller
than #cl(O). According to a heuristic of Cohen and Lenstra, this is true with
high probability for a “random” imaginary quadratic field [14, §9.I], and this
conjecture is in line with our own experimental evidence. So suppose
ρ : cl(O)  (Z/N,+)
is a surjective group homomorphism (which may be thought of as a projection to
the large cyclic subgroup followed by an isomorphism) and define αi = ρ([li]). We
may assume that α1 = 1; this can be done without loss of generality whenever
at least one of the [li] has order N in the class group. For some fixed [a] ∈ cl(O),
any short representation [le11 l
e2
2 · · · lenn ] = [a] yields a short solution to the linear
congruence
e1 + e2α2 + · · ·+ enαn ≡ ρ([a]) (mod N),
so counting solutions to this congruence gives an upper bound on the number
of short representations of [a]. These solutions are exactly the points in some




N 0 0 · · · 0
−α2 1 0 · · · 0






−αn 0 0 · · · 1
 ,
so by applying the Gaussian heuristic [50, Chapter 2, Definition 8] one expects
vol [−m;m]n / detL = (2m+ 1)n/N
short solutions. Since we assumed cl(O) to be almost cyclic, this ratio is not
much bigger than (2m + 1)n/#cl(O), which is not very large for our choice of
m as small as possible with (2m+ 1)n ≥ #cl(O).
As a result, we expect the complexity of a brute-force search to be around
2log
√
p−ε for some positive ε that is small relative to log√p. To verify our claims,
we performed computer experiments with many choices of p of up to 40 bits
(essentially brute-forcing the number of representations for all elements) and
found no counterexamples to the heuristic result that our sampling method loses
only a few bits of brute-force security compared to uniform sampling from the
class group. For our sizes of p, the min-entropy was no more than 4 bits less
than that of a perfectly uniform distribution on the class group (i.e. ε ≤ 4). Of
course this loss factor may grow in some way with bigger choices of p (a plot of
the data points for small sizes suggests an entropy loss proportional to log log p),
but we see no indication for it to explode beyond a few handfuls of bits, as long
as we find m and n so that (2m+ 1)n is not much larger than #cl(O).
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Meet-in-the-middle key search. Since a private key trivially decomposes
into a product of two smooth ideals drawn from smaller sets (e.g. splitting
[le11 l
e2
2 · · · lenn ] as [l
e1
1 · · · leνν ] · [l
eν+1
ν+1 · · · lenn ] for some ν ∈ {1, . . . , n}), the usual time-





≈ O( 4√p) apply.11 Another interpretation of this algorithm
is finding a path between two nodes in the underlying isogeny graph by con-
structing a breadth-first tree starting from each of them, each using a certain
subset of the edges, and looking for a collision. Details, including a memoryless
variation of this concept, can be found in Delfs and Galbraith’s paper [23], and
for the ordinary case in [28].
Remark 11. The algorithms mentioned thus far scale exponentially in the size of
the key space, hence they are asymptotically more expensive than the quantum
attacks outlined below which is subexponential in the class-group size. This
implies one could possibly balance the costs of the different attacks and use
a key space smaller than #cl(O) without any loss of security (unless the key
space is chosen particularly badly, e.g., as a subgroup), which leads to improved
performance. We leave a more thorough analysis of this idea for future work.
Pohlig–Hellman-style attacks. Notice that the set È `p(O, π) we are act-
ing on does not form a group with efficiently computable operations (that are
compatible with the action of cl(O)). Thus there seems to be no way to ap-
ply Pohlig–Hellman-style algorithms making use of the decomposition of finite
abelian groups. In fact, the Pohlig–Hellman algorithm relies on efficiently com-
putable homomorphisms to proper subgroups, which in the setting at hand would
correspond to an efficient algorithm that “projects” a given curve to the orbit
of E0 under a subgroup action. Therefore, we believe the structure of the class
group to be largely irrelevant (assuming it is big enough); in particular, we do
not require it to have a large prime-order subgroup.
7.2 Quantum security
We now discuss the state of quantum algorithms to solve Problem 10.
Grover’s algorithm and claw finding. Applying Grover search [33] via claw
finding as described in [39] is fully applicable to CSIDH as well, leading to an
attack on Problem 10 in O( 6√p) calls to a quantum oracle that computes our
group action. The idea is to split the search space for collisions into a classical
O( 6
√
p) target part and a O( 3√p) search part on which a quantum search is ap-
plied. Our choices of p that lead to classical security are also immediately large
enough to imply quantum security against this attack (cf. [49, §4.A.5 in Call for
11 Strictly speaking, the complexity depends on the size of the subset one samples
private keys from, rather than the size of the class group, but as was argued before,
these are approximately equal for our choice of m and n.
CSIDH: An Efficient Post-Quantum Commutative Group Action 21
Proposals]). That is, the number of queries to our quantum oracle necessary to
solve Problem 10 is larger than the number of quantum queries to an AES oracle
needed to retrieve the key of the corresponding AES instantiation via Grover’s
algorithm. For example, an AES-128 key can be recovered with approximately
264 (quantum) oracle queries, which requires us to set p > 2384. However, p
is much larger than that (see Table 1) due to the existence of subexponential
quantum attacks.
The abelian hidden-shift problem. A crucial result by Kuperberg [44] is an
algorithm to solve the hidden-shift problem with time, query and space complex-
ity 2O(
√
logN) in an abelian group H of order N . He also showed that any abelian
hidden-shift problem reduces to a dihedral hidden-subgroup problem on a differ-
ent but closely related oracle. A subsequent alternative algorithm by Regev [53]
achieves polynomial quantum space complexity with an asymptotically worse
time and query complexity of 2O(
√
logN log logN). A follow-up algorithm by Ku-
perberg [45] uses 2O(
√
logN) time, queries and classical space, but only O(logN)
quantum space. All these algorithms have subexponential time and space com-
plexity.
Attacking the isogeny problem. The relevance of these quantum algorithms
to Problem 10 has been observed by Childs–Jao–Soukharev [13] in the ordinary
case and by Biasse–Jao–Sankar [5] in the supersingular setting. By defining func-
tions f0, f1 : cl(O)→ È `p(O, π) as f0 : [b] 7→ [b]E and f1 : [b] 7→ [b]E′ = [b][a]E,
the problem can be viewed as an abelian hidden-shift problem with respect to f0
and f1. We note that each query requires evaluating the functions fi on arbitrary
ideal classes (i.e. without being given a representative that is a product of ideals
of small prime norm) which is non-trivial. However, Childs–Jao–Soukharev show
this can be done in subexponential time and space [13, §4].
Subexponential vs. practical. An important remark about all these quantum
algorithms is that they do not immediately lead to estimates for runtime and
memory requirements on concrete instantiations with H = cl(O). Although the
algorithms by Kuperberg and Regev are shown to have subexponential com-
plexity in the limit, this asymptotic behavior is not enough to understand the
space and time complexity on actual (small) instances. For example, Kuperberg’s
first paper [44, Theorem 3.1] mentions O(23
√
logN ) oracle queries to achieve a
non-negligible success probability when N is a power of a small integer. It also
presents a second algorithm that runs in Õ(3
√
2 log3N ) = O(21.8
√
logN ) [44, The-
orem 5.1]. His algorithms handle arbitrary group structures but he does not work
out more exact counts for those. Of course, this does not contradict the time
complexity of 2O(
√
logN) as stated above, but for a concrete security analysis
the hidden constants certainly matter a lot and ignoring the O typically under-
estimates the security. Childs–Jao–Soukharev [13, Theorem 5.2] prove a query















where N = #cl(O), for using Regev’s algorithm for solving the hidden-shift
problem. This estimates only the query complexity, so does not include the cost
of queries to the quantum oracle (i.e. the isogeny oracle). Childs–Jao–Soukharev
present two algorithms to compute the isogeny oracle, the fastest of which is due









ln p ln ln p
]
(2)
on the running time of Bisson’s algorithm.
Remark 12. Childs–Jao–Soukharev compute the total cost for computing the
secret isogeny in [13, Remark 5.5] to be Lp[1/2, 3/
√
2] (using Regev and Bis-
son’s algorithms, requiring only polynomial space). They appear to obtain this
by setting N = p when multiplying (1) and (2), but as N ∼ √p this is an
overestimation and should be Lp[1/2, 1 + 1/
√
2]. Either way, this is the largest
asymptotic complexity of the estimates. Also, Galbraith and Vercauteren [32]
point out this algorithm actually has superpolynomial space complexity due to
the high memory usage of the isogeny oracle in [13], but see [40].
Childs–Jao–Soukharev additionally compute the total time Lp[1/2, 1/
√
2] for
computing the secret isogeny combining Kuperberg [44] and Bisson. This re-
quires superpolynomial storage (also before considering the memory usage of
the oracle). Note that in this combination the costs of the oracle computation
dominate asymptotically.
It is important to mention that asymptotically worse algorithms may provide
practical improvements on our “small” instances over either of the algorithms
studied by Childs–Jao–Soukharev: For example, Couveignes [18, §5] provides
heuristic arguments that one can find smooth representatives of ideal classes
by computing the class-group structure (which can be done in polynomial time
on a quantum computer [35]) and applying a lattice-basis-reduction algorithm
such as LLL [46] to its lattice of relations. This might be more efficient than
using Childs–Jao–Soukharev’s subexponential oracle. However, note that this
method makes evaluating the oracle several times harder for the attacker than
for legitimate users, thus immediately giving a few additional bits of security,
since users only evaluate the action of very smooth ideals by construction. We
believe further research in this direction is necessary and important, since it will
directly impact the cost of an attack, but we consider a detailed analysis of all
these algorithms and possible trade-offs to be beyond the scope of this work.12
Remark 13. After we posted a first version of this paper on the Cryptology
ePrint Archive, there were several independent attempts at assessing the security
of CSIDH.
12 The page margins are certainly too narrow to contain such an analysis.
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Biasse, Iezzi, and Jacobson [4] work out some more details of the attack
ideas mentioned above for Regev’s algorithm. They focus on the class-group-
computation part of the oracle and they work out how to represent random
elements of the class group as a product of small prime ideals. Their analysis is
purely asymptotic and an assessment of the actual cost on specific instances is
explicitly left for future work.
Bonnetain and Schrottenloher [7] determine (quantum) query complexities
for breaking CSIDH under the assumption that the quantum memory can be
made very large, which implies that Kuperberg’s faster algorithms would be
applicable. They estimate the number of oracle queries as (5π2/4)21.8
√
logN .
The 1.8 appears to approximate the
√
2 log 3 in Kuperberg [44, Theorem 5.1].
They state 21.8
√
logN+2.3 for the number of qubits.
While we ignored Kuperberg’s algorithm due to the large memory costs,
they take the stance that “the most time-efficient version is relevant”, and so
do not ignore this algorithm. For small N the number of qubits stated in [7]
might be possible, which would indeed make Kuperberg’s algorithm relevant for
these sizes. However, in this case the total cost is dominated by the high cost
of computing the oracle, which Childs–Jao–Soukharev placed at Lp[1/2, 1/
√
2].
Bonnetain and Schrottenloher instead make use of Couveignes’ (exponential-
time, but perhaps better for small parameters) LLL-based method for the oracle
computation, but apply BKZ for more effective lattice-basis reduction.
The current version of Bonnetain–Schrottenloher [7] also presents concrete
estimates for the attack costs for our parameter sets, but unfortunately this
version ignores most of the cost of evaluating isogenies. For example: (1) Al-
gorithm 2 in our paper makes heavy use of input-dependent branches, which is
impossible in superposition [40, Section 4]; (2) [7] skips finding points of order `i
which are needed as the kernel of the `i-isogeny; (3) [7] applies a result for mul-
tiplication costs in F2n to multiplications in Fp. We analyzed the (significantly
higher) cost of a quantum oracle for isogeny evaluation and conclude that the
current estimates of Bonnetain–Schrottenloher do not imply that CSIDH-512
(see Section 7.3) is broken under NIST level 1 (cf. the reference to [2] below).
Jao, LeGrow, Leonardi, and Ruiz-Lopez recently made a preprint [40] of their
MathCrypt paper available to us. They address the issue of superpolynomial
space in the oracle computation identified by Galbraith and Vercauteren (stated
above) and give a new algorithm for finding short representations of elements.
Their paper focuses on the asymptotic analysis of the oracle step so that they
achieve overall polynomial quantum space, but does not obtain any concrete cost
estimates.
Bernstein, Lange, Martindale, and Panny analyze the cost of quantum eval-
uation of the CSIDH group action in [2]. Even after introducing several spee-
dups to arithmetic in finite fields and computing isogenies in superposition, for
CSIDH-512 it still takes 240 quantum operations on a quantum computer of
240 qubits to compute a single evaluation of the Kuperberg or Regev oracle for
success probability 2−32 and reduced range of exponents. They also give a more
detailed analysis of the shortcomings and errors in [7] mentioned above.
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7.3 Instantiations
Finally we present estimates for some sizes of p.
Security estimates. As explained in §7.1, the best classical attack has query
complexity O( 4√p), and the number of queries has been worked out for different













, respectively) as well as the pure query com-











logN ), respectively). We summarize the resulting attack complexities, ig-
noring the memory costs and without restricting the maximum depth of quantum
circuits, for some sizes of p in Table 1. We note again that we expect these com-
plexities to be subject to more careful analysis, taking into account the implicit
constants,13 the (in-)feasibility of long sequential quantum operations, and the
large memory requirement. We also include the recent estimates on the query
complexity and full attack complexity by Bonnetain and Schrottenloher [7].
We point out a recent analysis [1] which shows that the classical attack on
SIDH (which is the same for CSIDH) is likely slower in practice than current
parameter estimates assumed, which is due to the huge memory requirements
of the searches. Similarly, the cost of the quantum attacks is significantly higher
than just the query complexity times the cost of the group action because eval-
uating the oracle in superposition is significantly more expensive than a regular
group action.
Recall that public keys consist of a single element A ∈ Fp, which may be
represented using dlog pe bits. A private key is represented as a list of n integers
in {−m, . . . ,m}, where m was chosen such that n log(2m + 1) ≈ log√p, hence
it may be stored using roughly (log p)/2 bits. Therefore the rows of Table 1
correspond to public key sizes of 64, 128, and 224 bytes, and private keys are
approximately half that size when encoded optimally.
Security levels. We approximate security levels as proposed by NIST for the
post-quantum standardization effort [49, §4.A.5]. That is, the k-bit security level
means that the required effort for the best attacks is at least as large as that
needed for a key-retrieval attack on a block cipher with a k-bit key (e.g. AES-k
for k ∈ {128, 192, 256}). In other words, under the assumption that the attacks
query an oracle on a circuit at least as costly as AES, we should have a query
complexity of at least 2k−1 resp.
√
2k to a classical resp. quantum oracle. NIST
further restricts the power of the quantum computation to circuits of maximum
13 This is illustrated dramatically by the eighth column stating a complexity of
Lp[1/2, 1/
√
2] for [13]-Kuperberg, which we recall arises by multiplying the query
complexity of Kuperberg’s (first) algorithm and Childs–Jao–Soukharev’s estimate
Lp[1/2, 1/
√
2] for the running time of Bisson’s algorithm; so here it would make
more sense to add the corresponding entries of the fourth column, but we decided to
leave the numbers as they are in order to be consistent in the way we discard o(1)’s.
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Table 1. Estimated attack complexities ignoring limits on depth. The three rightmost
columns state costs for the complete attack; the others state classical and quantum
query complexities. All numbers are rounded to whole bits and use N = #cl(O) = √p,




































































































CSIDH-512 128 62 48 29 32.5 139 47 71
CSIDH-1024 256 94 68 41 44.5 209 70 88
CSIDH-1792 448 129 90 54 57.5 288 96 104
depth 240 up to 296, meaning that theoretically optimal tradeoffs (such as the
formulas in Table 1 above) might not be possible for cryptographic sizes.
The parameters for CSIDH-log p were chosen to match the query complexity
of Regev’s attack on the hidden-shift problem (see the third column in Table 1)
for roughly 2k/2, which should match NIST levels 1-3 as the group action com-
putation has depth at least as large as AES.
Some other algorithms give lower estimates which makes it necessary to eval-
uate the exact cost of the oracle queries or compute the lower-order terms in the
complexity. The analysis in [7, Table 8] states lower overall costs compared to
AES. While this is a signficant improvement, we believe that this does not affect
our security claim when accounting precisely for the actual cost of oracle queries,
as stated above. Our preliminary analysis shows costs of more than 250 qubit
operations for evaluating the oracle for log p = 512, where [7] assumes 237. This
means that the NIST levels are reached even with the low query numbers in [7].
More analysis is certainly needed and it is unclear whether that will result in
larger or smaller choices of p.
Note that adjusting parameters only involves changing the prime p (and a
few numbers derived from it) and is therefore very simple, should it turn out
that our initial estimates are insufficient.
8 Implementation
In this section, we outline our most important tricks to make the system easier
to implement or the code faster. As pointed out earlier, the crucial step is to use
a field of size 4 · `1 · · · `n − 1, where the `i are small distinct odd primes; this
implies that all `i are Elkies primes for a supersingular elliptic curve over Fp and
that the action of ideals (`i, π± 1) can be computed efficiently using Fp-rational
points. See Section 4 for these design decisions. The following section focuses on
lower-level implementation details.
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Montgomery curves. The condition p+1 ≡ 4 (mod 8) implies that all curves
in È `p(Z[π], π) can be put in the form y2 = x3 + Ax2 + x (cf. Proposition 8)
for some A ∈ Fp via an Fp-isomorphism. This is commonly referred to as the
Montgomery form [47] of an elliptic curve and is popular due to the very effi-
cient arithmetic on its x-line. This extends well to computations of isogenies on
the x-line, as was first shown by Costello–Longa–Naehrig [16, §3]. Our imple-
mentation uses exactly the same formulas for operations on curves. For isogeny
computations on Montgomery curves we use a projectivized variant (to avoid
almost all inversions) of the formulas from Costello–Hisil [15] and Renes [54].
This can be done as follows.
For a fixed prime ` ≥ 3, a point P of order `, and an integer k ∈ {1, . . . , `−1},









as polynomials in w, we observe that
(τ(A− 3σ) : 1) =
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and A is the Montgomery coefficient of the domain curve. By noticing that
x([k]P ) = x([`−k]P ) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , (`−1)/2} we can reduce the computation
needed by about half. That is, we can compute (τ(A−3σ) : 1) iteratively in about
5`M+`S operations14, noting that τ(A−3σ) is the Montgomery coefficient of the
codomain curve of an isogeny with kernel 〈P 〉 [54, Proposition 1]. If necessary,
a single division at the end of the computation suffices to obtain an affine curve
constant. We refer to the implementation for more details.
Note that for a given prime `, we could reduce the number of field operations
by finding an appropriate representative of the isogeny formulas modulo (a factor
of) the `-division polynomial ψ` (as done in [16] for 3- and 4-isogenies). Although
this would allow for a more efficient implementation, we do not pursue this now
for the sake of simplicity.
Rational points. Recall that the goal is to evaluate the action of (the class
of) an ideal le11 · · · lenn on a curve E ∈ È `p(Z[π], π), where each li = (`i, π − 1)
is a prime ideal of small odd norm `i and the ei are integers in a short range
{−m, . . . ,m}. We assume E is given in the form EA : y2 = x3 +Ax2 + x.
The obvious way to do this is to consider each factor l±1i in this product
and to find the abscissa of a point P of order `i on E, which (depending on the
sign) is defined over Fp or Fp2 \Fp. This exists by our choice of p and `i (cf.
14 Here M and S denote a multiplication and squaring in Fp.
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Section 4). Finding such an abscissa amounts to sampling a random Fp-rational
x-coordinate, checking whether x3+Ax2+x is a square or not (for l+1i resp. l
−1
i )
in Fp (and resampling if it was wrong), followed by a multiplication by (p+1)/`i
and repeating from the start if the result is ∞. The kernel of the isogeny given
by l±1i is then 〈P 〉, so the isogeny may be computed using Vélu-type formulas.
Repeating this procedure for all l±1i gives the result.
However, fixing a sign before sampling a random point effectively means
wasting about half of all random points, including an ultimately useless square
test. Moreover, deciding on a prime `i before sampling a point and doing the
cofactor multiplication wastes another proportion of the points, including both
an ultimately useless square test and a scalar multiplication. Both of these issues
can be remedied by not fixing an `i before sampling a point, but instead taking
any x-coordinate, determining the smallest field of definition (i.e. Fp or Fp2) of
the corresponding point, and then performing whatever isogeny computations
are possible using that point (based on its field of definition and order). The
steps are detailed in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Evaluating the class-group action.
Input: A ∈ Fp and a list of integers (e1, . . . , en).
Output: B such that [le11 · · · lenn ]EA = EB (where EB : y2 = x3 +Bx2 + x).
While some ei 6= 0 do
Sample a random x ∈ Fp.
Set s← +1 if x3 +Ax2 + x is a square in Fp, else s← −1.
Let S = {i | ei 6= 0, sign(ei) = s}. If S = ∅ then start over with a new x.
Let k ←
∏
i∈S `i and compute Q← [(p+ 1)/k]P .
For each i ∈ S do
Compute R← [k/`i]Q. If R =∞ then skip this i.
Compute an isogeny ϕ : EA → EB : y2 = x3 +Bx2 + x with kerϕ = R.
Set A← B, Q← ϕ(Q), k ← k/`i, and finally ei ← ei − s.
Return A.
Due to the commutativity of cl(O), and since we only decrease (the absolute
value of) each ei once we successfully applied the action of l±1i to the current
curve, this algorithm indeed computes the action of [le11 l
e2
2 · · · lenn ].
Remark 14. Since the probability that a random point has order divisible by `i
(and hence leads to an isogeny step in Algorithm 2) grows with `i, the isogeny
steps for big `i are typically completed before those for small `i. Hence it may
make sense to sample the exponents ei for ideals li from different ranges de-
pending on the size of `i, or to not include any very small `i in the factorization
of p + 1 at all to reduce the expected number of repetitions of the loop above.
Note moreover that doing so may also improve the performance of straightfor-
ward constant-time adaptions of our algorithms, since it yields stronger upper
bounds on the maximum number of required loop iterations (at the expense of
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slightly higher cost per isogeny computation). Varying the choice of the `i can
also lead to performance improvements if the resulting prime p has lower Ham-
ming weight. Finding such a p is a significant computational effort but needs to
be done only once; all users can use the same finite field.
Remark 15. Algorithm 2 is obviously strongly variable-time when implemented
naïvely. Indeed, the number of points computed in the isogeny formulas is linear
in the degree, hence the iteration counts of certain loops in our implementation
are very directly related to the private key. We note that it would not be very
hard to create a constant-time implementation based on this algorithm by always
performing the maximal required number of iterations in each loop and only
storing the results that were actually needed (using constant-time conditional
instructions), although this incurs quite a bit of useless computation, leading to
a doubling of the number of curve operations on average. We leave the design of
optimized constant-time algorithms for future work.
Public-key validation. Recall that the public-key validation method outlined
in Section 5 essentially consists of computing [(p+1)/`i]P for each i, where P is
a random point on E. Performing this computation in the straightforward way is
simple and effective. On the other hand, a divide-and-conquer approach, such as
the following recursive algorithm, yields better speeds at the expense of slightly
higher memory usage. Note that Algorithm 3 only operates on public data, hence
need not be constant-time in a side-channel resistant implementation.
Algorithm 3: Batch cofactor multiplication. [64, Algorithm 7.3]
Input: An elliptic-curve point P and positive integers (k1, . . . , kn).





If n = 1 then return (P ). // base case
Set m← dn/2e and let u←
∏m
i=1 ki, v ←
∏n
i=m+1 ki.
Compute L← [v]P and R← [u]P .
Recurse with input L, (k1, . . . , km) giving (Q1, . . . , Qm). // left half
Recurse with input R, (km+1, . . . , kn) giving (Qm+1, . . . , Qn). // right half
Return (Q1, . . . , Qn).
This routine can be used for verifying that an elliptic curve E/Fp is supersingular
as follows: Pick a random point P ∈ E(Fp) and run Algorithm 3 on input [4]P
and (`1, . . . , `n) to obtain the points Qi = [(p + 1)/`i]P . Then continue like in
Algorithm 1 to verify that E is supersingular using these precomputed points.
In practice, it is not necessary to run Algorithm 3 as a black-box function
until it returns all the points Q1, . . . , Qn: The order checking in Algorithm 1
can be performed as soon as a new point Qi becomes available, i.e., in the
base case of Algorithm 3. This reduces the memory usage (since the points Qi
can be discarded immediately after use) and increases the speed (since the al-
gorithm terminates as soon as enough information was obtained) of public-key
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validation using Algorithms 1 and 3. We note that the improved performance
of this algorithm compared to Algorithm 1 alone essentially comes from a time-
space trade-off, hence the memory usage is higher (cf. Section 8.1). On severely
memory-constrained devices one may instead opt for the naïve algorithm, which
requires less space but is slower.
8.1 Performance results
On top of a minimal implementation in the sage computer algebra system [68]
for demonstrative purposes, we created a somewhat optimized proof-of-concept
implementation of the CSIDH group action for a particular 512-bit prime p.
While this implementation features 512-bit field arithmetic written in assembly
(for Intel Skylake processors), it also contains generic C code supporting other
field sizes and can therefore easily be ported to other computer architectures or
parameter sets if desired.15
The prime p is chosen as p = 4·`1 · · · `74−1 where `1 through `73 are the smal-
lest 73 odd primes and `74 = 587 is the smallest prime distinct from the other `i
that renders p prime. This parameter choice implies that public keys have a size
of 64 bytes. Private keys are stored in 37 bytes for simplicity, but an optimal
encoding would reduce this to only 32 bytes. Table 2 summarizes performance
numbers for our proof-of-concept implementation. Note that private-key gener-
ation is not listed as it only consists of sampling n random integers in a small
range {−m, . . . ,m}, which has negligible cost.
Table 2. Performance numbers for our proof-of-concept implementation (2018.08.26),
averaged over 10 000 runs on an Intel Skylake i5 processor clocked at 3.5GHz.
Clock cycles Wall-clock time Stack memory
Key validation 5.5 · 106 cc 2.1ms 4 368 bytes
Group action 106 · 106 cc 40.8ms 2 464 bytes
We emphasize that both our implementations are intended as a proof of concept
and unfit for production use; in particular, they are explicitly not side-channel
resistant and may contain any number of bugs. We leave the design of hardened
and more optimized implementations for future work.
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